

I. **SOLIDARNOSC'S LEADERSHIP--WAS IT ALL RESTORATIONIST?**

Within the Solidarnosc leadership, there were three main tendencies.

The first tendency was the most openly restorationist. It consisted of KPN groups like the 'New Poles', and the right wing 'experts' who supported an open capitalist economy via the introduction of private enterprises, banks, etc. Both groups definitely had some support within rural Solidarnosc, but overall they were a distinct minority. The New Poles were an insignificant small minority with very little support. The right wing 'experts' consisted of the 'non-socialist' sector of the KOR, and others who perhaps dreamt about making phone calls to Wall Street, but beside some connections in Network, they had relatively small influence and support inside the mass organizations of Solidarnosc.

On the other side stood the reform Stalinist tendency, which was the strongest. Some of its people came directly from the CP--Lis Bogdan, for example, who was one of the original central leaders who emerged from the Lenin Shipyard. Together with the CP-ers stood the 'moderate' experts and the majority of the 'experts' from the KOR. They were tailed by different centrist groups, but they all agreed on the need to 'negotiate' with the Stalinists and on the need to establish advisory bodies (lower chamber in the Sejm, etc.). This tendency had the largest influence on the October program. We have already examined a great deal of empirical data showing that their main goals during the 1980-1 events were not to restore capitalism, and since reform of Stalinism was not possible, they stood with the Stalinists to stop the development of the political revolution.

In between these two tendencies stood the 'centrist' bonapartist Walesa tendency. The Walesa tendency, through its connection to the Church, had a very similar relationship with the Stalinists. Ideologically, Walesa agreed with the restorationist tendency and wanted to restore capitalism; but politically, Walesa, via his relationship with the Church, had too many interests and privileges derived from the Stalinist regime. Therefore, when it came down to 'pragmatic' politics, Walesa stood most of the time with the reform Stalinist tendency--or, more accurately, he tried to 'mediate' between the 'right' and the 'left' tendencies by finding the 'pragmatic' solution. It is for these reasons that Walesa became the figurehead--the 'Bonaparte'--of the Solidarnosc leadership.

According to the SL, the relationship between the masses and the leadership is always straightforward. Like all sectarian cynics, they see the masses as a simple image of the leadership. This has always been the heart of sectarianism. They sing "counterrevolutionary, counterrevolutionary, everybody is counterrevolutionary". And since they identify the leadership with the membership, they conceive the class struggle as something perhaps 'interesting', which the sectarian can exercise his (her) pen on. But alas, the sectarian doesn't need to intervene, because the workers are backward and 'reactionary'. This conception of the class struggle always allows the sectarian to keep indulging in his (her) petty bourgeois fantasies, which in the case of the SL also includes extremely degenerated cult life (all roads lead to the USSR and to Jim's Susanna Martin Choir!).

But reality in Poland was much different from the SL's cult fantasies. There was a very thick thread that bound together the Walesa/Church faction and the reform Stalinists, although each had a very different ideology. While each faction had a different aspiration toward the state (one wanted to 'reform' it, the other wanted to overthrow it), they both preferred the naked old Stalinist rule to the independent movement of the proletariat.

A. **THE KOR AND THE 'MODERATES'**

The KOR was not a party. It was basically a petty bourgeois movement that consisted of a fairly large, loose spectrum of forces. While it was dominated by disgruntled intellectuals who were in the CP in the fifties and sixties, the KOR included all kind of forces, including 'non-socialist' restorationist forces. Its main leaders, however, were Kuron, Michnik and Karol Modzelewski. These men, who in their youth had criticized Stalinism from the 'New Left Marxist' perspective, turned out basically--as we'll see later on--to be miserable Stalinist reformists, with social democratic 'pacifist' tilt, but nothing much more than that. Kuron and company, who adhered to the theory of 'peaceful' evolution of Stalinism to a 'humane' social democratic socialism, feared the mass movement that they happened to 'advise' much more than they feared the Stalinists. And despite their vocal protests and arrests, they advocated a 'gradual road to better socialism' by means of agreement with the Stalinists.

It is important to note that Kuron and company supported 'pluralism' and the formation of parties, and had the long-range goal of a Social Democratic government which would tolerate bourgeois parties. But during the 1980-81 events, they did not openly call for the formation of a bourgeois social democratic government. Because of their fears of the masses, they stood the whole time behind the banner of 'gradual reform of Stalinism' and 'Stalinism with a human face'. Regardless

of what may have been some of the KOR leaders' subjective long-range goals, it is their actual program and deeds in the big events of the Polish Revolution that should determine Marxists' attitude toward them.

Just before the Solidarnosc Congress, in the debate within the Union, Kuron proposed to accept the Stalinist economic program. At the time, the Stalinists had made some moves toward Solidarnosc, and had proposed some cosmetic reforms in the direction of workers' control that would seemingly (and this time the word 'seemingly' is fully justified) give a bit more control to local bodies in the factories. Kuron was enthusiastic about the prospects of working with the Stalinists. Thus, in the July '81 debate, he lectured the KK (National Commission) that:

"We [Solidarnosc] say the authorities have no programme ... but at the Newspaper kiosks we can buy a Programme for Overcoming the Crisis and Stabilising the Economy [published by the government in July]. I bought it and I want to tell you that it's worth discussing, that it's a significant document." (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 193)

So much for Kuron as a Wall Street Agent—one who pleads for Solidarnosc to accept the Stalinist program?!!!

The relationship of Kuron to the Stalinists follows the exact pattern of the relationship of Social Democracy to Capitalism: 'gradual evolution', more accurately described as collaboration and betrayal of the masses. Kuron expressed it beautifully when he said in an interview that:

"In so far as we—that's how I picture it—build up this pluralist structure in stages and gradually dismantle totalitarianism, step by step. Very slowly [Even the Social Democrats don't say it so clearly!!!]. The goals of the government and of the democratic movement are completely opposite. But the struggle between the two tendencies, the totalitarian and the democratic one, are to be fought exclusively by peaceful means. The observation of this rule by the government will determine the degree of partnership you mentioned." (Solidarnosc: From Gdansk to Military Repression, page 31)

Kuron, who tried so earnestly to apply the Stalinists' theories and practice toward imperialism (detente) in the internal situation in Poland, of course failed miserably. In no way was Stalinism ready to be a little bit less 'totalitarian' and have a nice peaceful relationship with Solidarnosc and the mass anti-Stalinist movement that accompanied it. Spartacism may have understood this (and sided with the Stalinists)—but not Kuron and company.

Karol Modzelewski, who was the co-author of the famous 'Open Letter to the Party', written with Kuron in 1964, jumped with joy when he heard about the new installation of the Jaruzelski government. Serving as a spokesman for Solidarnosc Press, he said in *Zycie Warszawy* that:

"...the establishment of a new government, its personnel composition and its policies as outlined in Prime Minister Jaruzelski's speech create real opportunities to turn back the dangerous course of events that became particularly visible during the last weeks..." (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 146).

This interview of Modzelewski's was given when Solidarnosc was at its height, during February and March 1981. The 'particularly visible dangerous course of events' that he was referring to was the preparation for a general strike.

Modzelewski and Kuron were the best representatives of the KOR position. Perhaps they best represented the 'majority' moderate factions of Solidarnosc. *IF THESE LEADERS WERE THINKING OF TAKING POWER AND RESTORING CAPITALISM, THEY DEFINITELY THOUGHT BETTER OF THAT IDEA WHEN THEY GOT SCARED OF THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION AND THE 'POSSIBILITY' THAT THE MASSES WOULD STEP OVER THEM IN THEIR STRUGGLES.* How else can we understand that every time the situation got 'hot', and Solidarnosc members were preparing a major confrontation, the 'moderates' and the KOR rushed screaming for help straight to the arms of the Stalinists.

The KOR leaders, who wanted just to reform Stalinism and nothing more, found themselves admiring the same man (Jaruzelski) that the SL admired toward the end of the same year. Strange common political interest? Not really. If one understands dialectic, one can understand how

sectarianism and reformism occasionally 'merge' behind the Stalinist Bonapartes.

The Reform Stalinism tendency was indeed very strong. Our friend Kuron, who was one of its main driving forces, kept coming up every month with a different proposal for 'advisory bodies' that would collaborate peacefully with the Stalinists. Ash comments that:

"Kuron was one of the first people to suggest the formation of (what he then called) a Committee of National Salvation, in which representatives proposed by the Party, Church and Solidarity would share power The other [proposal] was the Social Council for the National Economy, a body which would control the implementation of that economic reform on the basic outlines of which there was far-reaching agreement between government and Solidarity economists. This Social Council was now Solidarity's main quid pro quo for *SUPPORTING THE AUSTERITY PROGRAMME WHICH THEIR ADVISERS RECOGNISED AS NECESSARY.*" (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 255-56 (emphasis added))

Obviously, leaders who were trying to use the masses in order to take power and restore capitalism would not propose to the Stalinists that they create joint committees between the Stalinists and Solidarnosc to implement (with minor modifications) the same basic austerity program that the Stalinists proposed--unless they were out of their minds.

The real program of the KOR and the moderates was mild reform of the worst aspects of Stalinism (the police state). They were ready to tolerate the basic distortions of the deformed workers' state, via their support for 'necessary' austerity burdens on the masses, if the Stalinists would just give the KOR 'advisors' more room to operate. The intellectuals from the KOR wanted to share power with the bureaucracy, and even join it, if the bureaucracy would only eliminate some of its ugliest pimples.

Moreover, the KOR's propaganda for detente with Stalinism met with considerable success. This obvious fact was clearly understood by every one but the SL. For example, IS (state capitalists) wrote that at the Solidarnosc Congress:

"...yet the question of state power was still studiously avoided. Krzysztof Wyszowski, secretary of the *Solidarity Weekly* editorial board, actually delivered a hostile attack on those who might dare to raise it. In a short article, 'Extremists and stupid children', he was as scathing against 'one of the experts to the National Commission who wrote that the party had already been deprived of power and we should be looking around for something to replace it.'" (Solidarnosc: From Gdansk to Military Repression, page 60)

This is just one more example to show the comrades that Solidarnosc was still a contradictory movement around the Congress. But it is also a clear illustration of how deep the KOR's illusions still were about the CP. The KOR and the moderate experts wanted to pressure it, but not to overthrow it.

Here we must stop for a minute and look at Jan Lipinski's speech at the Congress. Professor Lipinski, who was one of the main leaders of KOR, was looked at by the Left as a 'model' for a socialist and an anti-Stalinist. In reality, Lipinski was just a standard reform Stalinist advisor and a 'moderate'. He did refer, in his speech, to some need for market economy, and even called for private industry to be introduced "in small industry and restaurants". Nonetheless, Lipinski was definitely a reform Stalinist (an early Gorbachevite)--*NOT* a restorationist. In his speech, he said that:

"I have considered myself a socialist since 1906, but the real struggle for a better and democratic economy, for ownership of the the non-state means of production, where a group of new non-private owners has come into being, is a struggle for democratic management in the factories, for political freedom which is a characteristic of the socialist state There are anti-socialist and anti-revolutionary forces. But, in my opinion, it is their socialism that is anti-socialist and anti-revolutionary [thunderous applause]." (Bay Area Solidarity Support Campaign Bulletin, March, page 5)

The question that comes to mind upon reading this is why Lipinski received 'thunderous applause' when he said that real socialism means democratic control by the working class over the mean of production, and characterized the Stalinist bureaucracy as anti-socialist? If the delegates in the congress really were anti-communist, and wanted to use self-management as an anti-socialist

measure to restore capitalism, they would not respond with *THUNDEROUS APPLAUSE* to a speech counterposing the democratic socialism of the workers to that of the bureaucracy. This is just another example demonstrating that Solidarnosc had growing contradictions around the time of the Congress.

In a very interesting discussion we had on the Lipinski speech, comrade Dave E.'s approach beautifully exemplified the entire method of the SL. Lipinski, he said, is a Pilsudskyite, because he belonged to the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which was a pro-Pilsudskyite Party. Therefore, he claimed, Lipinski is basically a Pilsudskyite and a restorationist to his bones, and thus, he didn't really believe in a word of his speech.

Now, Comrade Dave E. is one of the most intelligent comrades in the BT. The problem is not his Marxist abilities, but the fact that he hasn't fully broken from what he learned in the SL. First of all, even if within the PPS there were people who were sympathetic to Pilsudsky, the PPS itself was not pro-Pilsudskyite, but was a Social Democratic Party--which, in fact, fused with the Stalinists after the Second World War, and together with them formed the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), which is the current Communist Party. But let's leave the 'theoreticians' of the SL, who lied to their members about basic facts, alone for now. What interests us is the entire method of thinking of the SL, which is so foreign to Marxist thought.

Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Lipinski really is just a Pilsudskyite, what the delegates heard in his speech, and gave him thunderous applause for, was that he defended workers' democracy as the only way to build socialism. But if we take the SL's logic to its conclusion, we must conclude that the delegates are basically Pilsudskyites as well, and that the reason for their applause was not that they really thought Lipinski was defending the struggle for workers' democratic control as a true road to socialism. No! what the 'Pilsudskyite' workers actually thought, and applauded, was that Lipinski was lying through his teeth. And perhaps the purpose of all this was to get the support of the Left in the world, while what the delegates were really 'preparing' to do, together with Lipinski and the rest of the 'moderate' wing of Solidarnosc, was to overthrow the workers' state We need not elaborate any further on the SL's 'profound' dialectic thinking.

In reality, Lipinski never opposed Kuron and the other 'moderates' in their approach of reforming Stalinism. He just was able to give the delegates a more militant speech, in order to give the 'moderates' some 'Marxist' credentials (he declared many times that he considered himself to a Marxist). Due to the growing contradictions within Solidarnosc, the 'moderates' needed someone who could appear as their 'revolutionary socialist' wing in order to lull the millions of CP-ers and workers who were getting impatient with the Solidarnosc leadership's reformist perspective. It was for these reasons that Lipinski received such 'thunderous' applause.

B. THE WALESA WING, THE CHURCH, AND THE SL--A VERY STRANGE ALLIANCE

The 'moderate' factions, which included many leaders who were not in the KOR, had much more influence on the Walesa/Church faction within Solidarnosc than the right wing, openly restorationist faction did. But it is impossible to understand Walesa's role in Solidarnosc, and his relationship to the reform Stalinist faction, without understanding the Church's role.

Walesa played the same mediating role as the Church. He was the broker that negotiated with the Stalinist bureaucracy for all the gains of the masses for the benefit of the Catholic Church. Every time the Church waved its wand, Walesa complied. The long-term interest of the Church, like that of Walesa, was capitalist restoration. But the Church received an enormous amount of privilege from the Polish state. The Church's influence in Poland is so strong that it is almost a state within the deformed workers' state.

To understand the role of the Church, one must understand that in no other deformed workers' state is the mistrust and hatred toward the bureaucracy so complete. If anyone is responsible for religious domination, it is first of all the Stalinist bureaucracy. The extent of religious domination is to a large extent due to the overwhelming combination of bureaucratic distortions and oppression. The bureaucracy is forced into a 'catch-22' situation. It caused the overwhelming support for the Church, but it has to collaborate with it because it cannot control the masses without the Church, which still maintains its long-range goal of restoring Capitalism. From the bureaucracy's point of view, the church could control the day-to-day culture, and almost every thing else that the masses did 'after work', as long as the Church would muzzle the hatred toward the bureaucracy. Thus, the Stalinists allowed the Church almost free rein, including many deputies in the Sejm.

In effect, the Stalinists signed a contract with the Church in which they said: "You muzzle the

masses, and we'll give you free functioning". It is impossible, in this chapter, to describe the scope of the Stalinists' betrayals, via their collaborations with the Church, in the 1956, 1970 and 1976 uprisings. Suffice it to say that the Church always respected the 'contract', and *PROTECTED THE BUREAUCRACY'S INTERESTS AS LONG AS THE BUREAUCRACY ALLOWED IT TO KEEP ITS PROPERTY AND PRIVILEGES*.

The Church and Walesa had a dilemma in the 1980-81 revolution. There was no guarantee that the masses would follow Walesa and company and bring direct imperialist and Vatican rule. If the factories and the self-management bodies were to establish more workers' democracy, and were to give the workers more confidence in their own ability to control society (and defeat the Stalinists), the workers might awake to the reactionary role of the Church, and its corruption as well. Revolutions never bring stability, in the brittle minds of the Cardinals. The uncertainty it creates makes the old relationship (with the Stalinists) preferable. The Stalinists may not be as good as Reagan in the long run, but compared to the present chaos, the past stability was damn good!

Every time that the question of power was posed, and whenever Solidarnosc threatened a major action, the Church rushed to the defense of the bureaucracy. Once again, the reality was exactly opposite to the pipe-dreams of the SL. Yes--the Church played a reactionary role with Walesa. But on the side of the Stalinists!!

There are many incidents that expose the role of the Church in defense of the bureaucracy, but we cannot describe them all in this chapter. We have room for only two.

In March 1981, Walesa stopped a general strike. Millions of workers who had made preparations for a long and decisive strike were told to go back to work. There was no doubt that the Church was turning the key in the back of its Walesa wind-up toy. As Timothy Garton Ash remarks very wittily:

"Now was the time for all good men to come to the aid of the Party. Privately, the Church leaders closest to Cardinal Wyszyński took a rather similar position. 'You know this may sound strange coming from a Cardinal of the Church', the Primate himself reportedly told a government adviser in January 1981, '*BUT WHAT WE NEED NOW IS A STRONG PARTY LEADERSHIP*' The more Church leaders felt that sovereignty (however limited) was threatened, the more they were drawn into the political arena, and the more they felt compelled to throw their authority on the side of '*odnowa*' [the Stalinist bureaucracy], though they talked of 'national' rather than 'socialist' renewal, of 'calm' and 'responsibility' and 'restraint'.

"*POLAND NOW PRESENTED THE PARADOXICAL SPECTACLE OF A CHURCH LEADER AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH HAD IMPRISONED HIM BOTH SILENTLY PRAYING THAT THE OTHER SHOULD RECOVER STRENGTH*. The Party knew that this Primate might sway Walesa, as he had in March, to the side of caution. Wyszyński, now seventy-nine years old and a dying man, exacted a price for his support. Beside direct concessions, such as permission to build new seminaries in Koszalin and Szczecin, he had, for instance, made Jaruzelski promise to register 'Rural Solidarity.'" (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity pp. 167-69 (emphasis added)).

How nicely put! The Church supported Jaruzelski for the common short-term stability interests of both parties. Walesa stopped any direct immediate threats, while Jaruzelski guaranteed that he would maintain the Church's privileges, and even extend them further (more new seminaries, etc.). The Church also got a small piece of meat (the Rural Solidarity 'promise') that might be useful in the future for its long-term goal of capitalist restoration.

But, alas, the Church was too busy achieving the short-term goal of protecting its immediate interests. In the fall of 1981, the Solidarnosc leadership, and in particular the Church's direct agent within it--Lech Walesa--lost considerable authority within Solidarnosc. And the increased instability, which threatened both *JARUZELSKI AND THE CHURCH, BROUGHT THEM--SURPRISE, SURPRISE--TO THE VERY SAME SIDE OF THE BARRICADES IN DECEMBER 1981. THE SL HAD A VERY INTERESTING ALLY BEHIND THE TANKS, STANDING FOR MARTIAL LAW. Yes, Comrades, the Church SUPPORTED MARTIAL LAW!!!!*

On December 13, the same day that martial law was imposed, Archbishop Glemp, the new Primate, declared that:

"Opposition to the decisions of the authorities during the state of war could provoke violent

attempts to enforce compliance. This could provoke bloodshed While some could accuse the Church of cowardice ... it has regarded and always will regard human life as the supreme value **EACH HEAD AND EACH PAIR OF HANDS WILL BE PRICELESS IN REBUILDING POLAND AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE STATE OF WAR.**" (Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, Spr. 1982, page 34 (emphasis added))

Glomp stopped supporting martial law after the situation stabilised. But so did the SL! After the Stalinist bureaucracy finished its 'job' and brought 'stability'—i.e., crushed the working class—the interests of the Church were protected!

Walesa himself, despite his 'moderate' tone, was not a reform Stalinist. He made it quite clear what his long-term goals were. When members of reform Stalinist factions were asked if they supported socialism, their answer was a clear yes. Here is what Walesa said when asked if communism had failed:

"...I answer that communism has done very little for us. If you choose the example of what is in our souls instead, I answer that communism has done very much for us. In fact, our souls contain exactly the contrary of what they wanted. They wanted us not to believe in God, and our Churches are full." (The Solidarnosc Sourcebook, page 104)

In this entire interview, which was given to a 'leftist', Walesa avoided saying whether there can be a better socialism than Stalinism. After all, the Church doesn't think so!

Despite the serious differences between the Walesa/Church faction and the reform Stalinists, they ended up in the same bloc. Both factions feared the masses and went to the Stalinists for cover.

Walesa also had known the "moderate" leaders of the KOR for a long time. They had years of experience together in which they dealt with the bureaucracy. Between 1976 and 1980, Walesa worked together with the KOR in the formation of the small Baltic Free Trade Union. There Walesa, as a representative of the Church, learned that if you want to get something from the bureaucracy, it is not enough to compromise the workers' interests—you also have to praise it. Later, in 1981, when he was calling off strikes, he used to say in reference to Jaruzelski that:

"I like soldiers ... but, seriously, I have respect for him [Jaruzelski]: I think he's all right, that he's a good Pole." (Le Monde, 21 March 1981)

And Walesa too proved to be a 'good Pole' on behalf of the Church and the Stalinists!! As time was running out, and the reformist leadership, in a bloc with Walesa, were losing control over the militancy of the rank-and-file, Walesa and Jaruzelski were working as a team to prepare the ground for nothing other than martial law (although Walesa may not have understood this subjectively). The New Yorker reporter describes fairly accurately what happened in the fall of 1981:

"Walesa calls an hour-long national strike, in part, surely, to confront the government with the continuing fact of the union's cohesion and determination, but in larger part because he's trying to stem the growing tide of wildcat actions being undertaken by the more radical elements within his own union. Jaruzelski responds by getting Parliament to pass a resolution (one that, admittedly, for the moment lacks any teeth) calling for an end to strikes. Walesa in turn responds by denouncing the resolution and proclaiming that Solidarity will never give up its hard-won right to strike; but within a few sentences, he is pleading with all the wildcat strikers to abandon their actions and return to work. [Not a bad division of labor between Walesa and Jaruzelski!!!] As the month of October comes to an end, Walesa's Authority is once again on the line: he is touring the country speaking at one strike-bound plant after another, trying to reassert the union's solidarity and get the workers back to work. It is becoming clear that in the months ahead we will be witnessing a race between the growing frustration of the union's membership and the waning authority of its leadership." (Solidarity: Poland in the Season of its Passion, page 122)

It is very difficult to comprehend how, with such a leadership, the question of the defense of Collective Property Relations was DIRECTLY posed, as the fused BT theses claim. Far from posing any such threat, this 'leadership' was busy going from one plant to another and telling the workers that for

the sake of 'unity' [unity of the Church, Solidarnosc, and Stalinism!], they had better *STOP* threatening Stalinism, and (by returning to work) keep on *MAINTAINING* the distorted bureaucratic Collective Property Relations!

And Walesa, the Church, the Stalinists, and the reform Stalinists were not alone. They had some 'friends' in the West. Workers Vanguard screams, in the fall of 1981, that in order to eat the workers have to work!! So we had very colorful allies joining the Stalinists' attacks on the working class—including the 'Trotskyists' from Warren Street.

The Spartacists could not grasp what was going on, because they viewed everything from the paranoia of the Pilsudskyites taking over Poland. But—to repeat once again—the main concern of the majority of Solidarnosc's leadership was not to restore capitalism, but to preserve the deformed workers' state, as the only alternative they had against the uprising of the workers that was getting out of their control. They did not want the crisis to develop into a power confrontation. The songs of Walesa and the moderates were the overwhelming songs of the leadership. Timothy Garton Ash expressed it best when he wrote:

"Sharing power—but not over the guns or bridge—the crew and the Captain would work together to save the sinking ship." (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 194).

This was clearly echoed by Solidarnosc Weekly. On August 7, 1981, it declared:

"We want to see the authorities working energetically, unambiguously on the basis of partnership with Solidarity,... and we want our union to co-operate energetically to overcome the crisis."(The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 194)

Walesa delivered his part of the deal—and he energetically 'overcame' the crisis by breaking strikes and by demoralizing the workers. And, whether he understood it or not, he was giving the Stalinists the necessary breathing time to prepare for the December 13 coup.

II. DID SOLIDARNOSC'S LEADERSHIP WANT TO TAKE POWER?

What should Trotskyists have done? Once again, we would have stood on the other side of the barricades, against the SL. While the SL would have 'warned' against restoration (and stood behind the Stalinists), we would have warned that the main danger was not Solidarnosc's relationship with imperialism, but its relationship with the Stalinist bureaucracy. We would have warned that the main problem with the leadership was its resistance to the political revolution and fear of it. Clearly, the long-range goal of restoration should have been raised, but that was not the main task in the fall of 1981.

Here we come to one of the main issues that separates us from the ex-SLers. Was the question of defense of the workers' state POSED DIRECTLY in the fall of 1981, as the fusion theses claim? Our answer is flatly *NO*. The main problem of the Polish revolution was that the Solidarnosc leadership stopped the process of the political revolution; it did not want to take power.

The best time for Solidarnosc to take power was not in the fall-winter, but in the early spring of 1981. At the beginning of 1981, Solidarnosc was a powerful union at the height of its strength. The Stalinist bureaucracy was crumbling and paralyzed. The Union leadership had authority and control. If it had been willing to take power, there is no doubt that the workers would have gone along. Throughout January and February of 1981, there were growing numbers of strikes. Despite the attempts of Walesa to stop them, the workers put their strong hands around the throat of the bureaucracy.

The workers, who did not like the National Commission's hesitation, were saying "The government has its back to the wall, but we do not. Our walls are the rank and file." (Associate Press no. 1, pp. x-xiv). In the debate in the KK (National Commission), Kuron responded to the workers with the famous sentence: "We must remember that we cannot overthrow the government." (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 141)

In March 1981, the workers were ready for a big confrontation. The ostensible cause for the March crisis was the beating of Solidarnosc activists in Bydgoszcz, including the Solidarnosc leader Rulewski. This incident was just the spark that millions of workers were waiting for. The preparation for a major confrontation was universal. Here is how Ash describes the situation:

"...most Polish working people were preparing, with nervous determination, for the general strike. Lorryloads of bread, sausage and jam rolled into Huta Warszawa. Workers, typists, students, teachers, all brought their sleeping bags to their workplaces over the weekend in some plants, acetylene torches, gasolines and chemicals were readied for possible defence against the "forces of order"..." (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 159)

In the course of a revolution (or counterrevolution, if the ex-SLers please), the opportunity to take power arises once or at best twice. Missing such an opportunity usually marks the decline of the movement. This is precisely what happened to Solidarnosc. *IF SOLIDARNOSC'S LEADERSHIP WANTED TO TAKE POWER, THIS WAS THEIR BEST OPPORTUNITY.*

Let's return to Ash to find out what Solidarnosc's leadership did the night the workers brought their sleeping bags into the factories:

"When millions of Poles turned on their television sets for the seven-thirty evening news, they were fully prepared for this to be their last evening at home for some time. Tomorrow they would be spending the night at their workplace, and the day after tomorrow...who knew? They swapped the old jokes about remembering your fur coat for Siberia. Instead, they saw Andrzej Gwiazda-Gwiazda of all people-hesitantly, almost apologetically, reading out a summary of the agreement, with Walesa standing next to him, looking nervous and foxy. After all that organisation, all that psychological preparation, the strike was 'suspended'." (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, pp. 169-70)

If Solidarnosc's leadership was all restorationist, as the SL claims, at this point Wall Street should have screamed 'Betrayal'!!

In March, also, Solidarnosc could have split the army. The Stalinists did not then have the professional elite to do the job that they later were able to do in December. Ash's comment on this is very informative:

"The second possibility [in March '81] is therefore that Kania and Jaruzelski would have decided to use their contingency plans for a 'state of war', and that they would, in fact, have succeeded in using the army and security forces to crush resistance as they did after 13 December. *HOWEVER, SOLIDARITY WAS, AS WE HAVE SEEN, FULLY PREPARED FOR SUCH A DANGER, THE WORKERS WERE OCCUPYING THEIR FACTORIES AND THE WHOLE SOCIETY WAS MOBILISED IN A WAY IT DEFINITELY WAS NOT BY DECEMBER. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE CAN HAVE BEEN LITTLE OF THE HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL, DETAILED AND SECRET PLANNING, NOT TO MENTION THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION OF THE ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES, WHICH PRECEDED THE BRILLIANTLY EXECUTED COUP OF 13 DECEMBER.* In December, the loyalty of the conscript army was not put to the hardest test, since flying squads of security thugs and professional soldiers were sufficient to break the pockets of workers' resistance. Large numbers of conscript soldiers were not ordered to fire on their brothers. In March, it would almost certainly have come to that. *THE THIRD POSSIBILITY, THEREFORE, IS THAT THE AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE TRIED AND FAILED TO CRUSH SOLIDARITY WITH THE POLISH FORCES AT THEIR DISPOSAL.*" (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 165 (emphasis added))

Very well said! In March, Solidarnosc could have split the conscript army and taken power. By December, the Stalinists had had enough time to prepare the highly trained professional army, which Solidarnosc could not have split in order to take power. But the real problem was that the Solidarnosc leadership did not want to take power—either in March or in December. They were just as much afraid of the workers taking power as the Stalinists were.

In the summer and fall of 1981, a big wave of strikes and struggles against the Stalinist bureaucracy developed in a very different political direction than previously; it developed independently, and against the Solidarnosc leadership.

In the fall, the Solidarnosc leadership appealed to the workers to give up one of the few gains of the Gdansk Agreement. In the agreement, the Stalinists had conceded a free Saturday for the union members. Now the leadership sided with the Stalinists, and asked the membership to work on most Saturdays in order to increase production—for the 'nation'. At the same time, our 'restorationist' leaders asked for the end of wildcat and in particular hunger strikes, which then became a major way for the workers to assert their independence from the Solidarnosc leadership. (See The Polish Revolution: Solidarnosc, page 203).

Throughout the fall, Walesa fulfilled all the requirements of his new job, which was to be the leading firefighter for Jaruzelski and the Church. Our poor 'restorationist' was running from one region to another, pleading with workers to stop striking and follow the orders of the Stalinists. In November, for example, he rushed to Tarnobrzeg to stop a general strike there. At the same time, the independent wildcat and hunger strikers besieged the National Commission's meetings, screaming "Enough of your discussions and your project for resolutions! ... Do something!" (La Monde, 13 November 1981).

Like Walesa, Jan Litynski, the editor of the KOR newspaper Robotnik, also showed the real face of the KOR when he denounced the Polish workers' hunger strike as "'a danger the union has not known how to avoid' which 'risks degenerating into unofficial strikes.'" (Solidarnosc: From Gdansk to Military Repression, page 75)

The firefighter job of the Solidarnosc leadership resulted in a profound demoralization within the Solidarnosc rank-and-file. This gave the Stalinists plenty of time to prepare for their secret coup. It is very difficult for a normal Marxist to understand why a 'Pilsudskyite' leadership, which was 'preparing' to take power and restore capitalism, would go out of its way to ready the ground for the Stalinist coup via the deep demoralization of the working class. But who said that the SL was ever a normal Marxist group!

In the middle of the fall, the 'center' leadership of Solidarnosc (Walesa and company) was losing a considerable number of members to the Centrist Left and—yes—even to the Stalinists. Even the IS (state capitalists in England), who supported Solidarnosc quite blindly, had to admit it:

"The government argued day in and day out that the strikes were worsening the supply situation. At first people refused to listen. Those involved in the strike wave knew they had no choice

but to fight. But, as sections began to return to work, *SOME OF THEM BEGAN TO BELIEVE THE REGIME*, and to criticise those still on strike. And why not? After all, Solidarity's own praesidium was saying, in effect, much the same as the regime. Within Solidarity's own ranks, the signs of confusion and demoralisation began to appear. The strike wave reached its peak at the end of October, and then declined quite rapidly. Five weeks later, one representative told a national delegate meeting that, whereas previously no one had believed the regime's lies, *NOW A THIRD OF ALL WORKERS COUNTED SOLIDARITY, AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT, AS BEING TO BLAME FOR THE CRISIS*. Karol Modzelewski argued 'The union is not as strong as it was. It is weaker, and every activist knows it'. On November 8th, a poll reported that only 30% of people were ready to participate in a general strike." (Solidarnosc: From Gdansk to Military Repression, pp. 75-76)

The IS did not exaggerate. If anything, they underestimated the situation. Our 'friend' Jan Litynski (the editor of Robotnik), who didn't particularly like hunger strikes, already predicted the defeat of Solidarnosc as early as August. In his pathetic contribution to the debate within the leadership, he cried that:

"It seems that waiting to see what the authorities do and negotiating compromises has proved ineffective. Solidarity is slowly losing points. It is disappointing members. Those who expected the economic situation to improve, are as disappointed as those who hoped that the radicalism of the union movement would bring about new political structures and the fall of the current power structure. Their hopes have been dashed." (Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, Spr. 82, page 15)

Litynski's only alternative to 'negotiating compromises' was to side with the Stalinists against hunger strikes, which he called "wildcat and RIOTS"—a terminology that even the Stalinists used with extreme care. Kuron echoed his 'comrade', and said in the same debate that "there is a perceptible inclination toward the idea of strong government." (Ibid.)

And Kuron was right. Solidarnosc was entering into a deep crisis, and as we have said many times, it was undergoing serious polarization. Part of the membership moved to the Left and the active strike movement, but at the same time not a small portion of the membership moved to the camp of Jaruzelski. Yes! a good portion of the backward workers who would have been a sitting duck for capitalist restoration moved in the direction of a strong military Stalinist dictatorship. Without their support, the December 13 coup would have been much bloodier.

Why did the 'restorationist' leadership, which—according to the SL—was preparing to take power, allow *ITS MOST TRUSTWORTHY SUPPORTERS (THE BACKWARD WORKERS)* to move to the enemy camp? I think that the ex-SLers will have to think quite deeply to come up with a reasonable answer. Ironically, the most right-wing workers, those from the New Pole faction of the KPN, were the fastest ones to move to the Stalinist camp. *ONCE THEIR HOPES FOR THE 'NATIONAL' (I.E., CAPITALIST) REGENERATION OF POLAND WERE SHATTERED INTO PIECES BY THE DOCILE REFORM STALINIST LEADERSHIP OF SOLIDARNOSC, THEY PREFERRED THE REAL STALINISTS!*

But not only the KPN members looked to Jaruzelski for a strong government solution; the support for such a solution was much broader. Let's return to Timothy Garton Ash, who despite his limitations had much better insight into the situation than the SL.

"Ironically, what might be described as a more 'extreme' or 'radical' tendency in Solidarity, the 'True Poles' and KPN supporters, were most emphatic in their approval of the army which was being prepared to crush them. In Lodz, where this tendency was strong, Solidarity members put the army third only to Solidarity and the Church in their hierarchy of trust. 32.8 per cent of a sample asked at the end of October declared their confidence in it. In Wroclaw, a referendum in one enterprise where 'True Poles' were strong revealed a 90 per cent vote for excising the 'leading role of the Party' from the constitution, and 88 per cent vote for a new parliament, but also an 82 per cent vote of confidence in Jaruzelski! (AS, no.50, p.401) From Wroclaw, too, was reported an affectionate graffito in response to Jaruzelski's unprecedented concentration of offices: Defence Minister, Prime Minister and Party leader. It read, 'Wojtek, when will you become a Cardinal?' (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, page 248)

Everything followed the classic Marxist analysis. When the working class and its leadership did not provide the answer, the most backward elements of society looked to the other side to give them security. And the other side was not the fascists. Marxism is not dogmatic and sterile. The fascists/pro capitalist forces were weak and did not have enough support, so the backward workers and peasants were forced to look to the only remaining alternative that could give them stability--the ruthless, Bonapartist dictatorship of the Polish Thermidor; i.e., the naked dictatorship of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

After all this, do the comrades still think that the majority of the Solidarnosc leadership was contemplating taking power? Marxists understand that if one is preparing to take power, one is preparing for a civil war. In the next chapter, we will show the comrades, very patiently, what 'preparations' the Solidarnosc leadership was making for civil war--outside of breaking strikes and demoralizing the membership!

III. *SOLIDARNOSC'S 'PREPARATION' FOR CIVIL WAR*

It is very painful for us to have to demonstrate the ridiculousness of the SL's contention (which the ex-SLers fully support) that Solidarnosc's leadership was preparing to overthrow the workers' state and establish capitalism by means of civil war.

In the crucial last few months before the military took over, the demoralization within the rank-and-file was growing daily. If there was any military preparation within Solidarnosc, it was done by the left wing (see chapter on the left within Solidarnosc). But in general, the preparations on the part of the leadership for a military confrontation, or even for a general strike, were almost nil. On the very eve of December 13, the only preparations that had been made were minor contingency plans in case the leadership was arrested.

Bujak, who supposedly was one of the 'radicals' who were preparing to take power, didn't speak as if he had made any serious preparation. He admitted to the New York Times later that:

"It was becoming clear that the authorities were planning a sizable operation against the union. But we never thought it would be as serious as this...."

Ash comments that right before December 13:

"A few technical preparations for resistance were made in a few regions: printing materials were hidden and, in Lodz at least, rough contingency plans for the arrest of the regional leadership were drawn up. But there were no such plans nationally, neither were there any attempts to set up an alternative radio communications network between factories and regions, though the experience of August 1980 showed how crucial communications would be for the chances of a general strike." (The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, pp. 248-49).

It is obvious that by December 1981, Solidarnosc was much less well prepared to deal with the Stalinists than it had been in August 1980. Indeed, in December 1981, even the most elementary preparation for a general strike was not done (compare this to March 1981).

Moreover, the information available today indicates that the Solidarnosc leadership knew months in advance about the general plans of General Jaruzelski! Yet they did nothing--absolutely nothing. Not only were they totally unprepared to take power--they were not even prepared to show serious resistance to the Stalinist coup!

In mid-October, the 44th bulletin of the Solidarity news agency (AS) reported that:

"Siwak informed members of the branch trades unions at a meeting in Krosno that a six-man Committee of National Salvation had been formed, with Generals Jaruzelski and Kiszczak at its head. Special units of the army and the police had also been established to put down popular resistance. The Party and government leadership *WOULD WAIT ANOTHER TWO MONTHS BEFORE USING THEM, WHILE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SOLIDARITY WEAKENED*. A decision to rescind the registration of Solidarity should be reckoned with." (AS no. 44, p. 205 (quoted in Congress Post (BIPS Foreign Dept.), 4 October 1981, page 4) (emphasis added))

Amazing! how accurate!! Not only did they know that Jaruzelski was preparing to crush them, but in *OCTOBER THEY KNEW SPECIFICALLY THAT THE COUP WOULD COME IN DECEMBER!* So the Solidarnosc leadership ran around crying, pleading, nervously attacking and blaming each other, complaining, trying to avoid the *CRUSH* by breaking more strikes and showing the Stalinists what good boys and girls they were. But did they prepare a counteroffensive--NO! So what kind of 'professional' counterrevolutionists was the SL attacking behind the Stalinists' tanks? With such restorationists, we can all sleep in peace! Almost everybody knew it, almost everybody saw it--except the SL and the Stalinist propaganda.

How did our 'counterrevolutionary restorationist leadership', armed with the knowledge that Jaruzelski was going to strike in December, prepare its ranks for a counteroffensive? The IS, which wanted Solidarnosc to take power, complains bitterly that:

"Opportunities to contribute to the internal fragmentation of the armed forces were missed. When the police began to demand their own Solidarity Unions, there were a few banners and

demonstrations in support. No serious effort was ever made to organise large demonstrations outside the local police stations in support of police unionism. The army, whose lower ranks are mostly working class and peasant conscripts, never had any significant agitation directed at them. When young soldiers whose 'demob' time had come, in October 1981, were told they had to stay in the army for a further two months, there was no wave of agitation in their support." (Solidarnosc: From Gdansk to Military Repression, page 98)

One had to be rather obtuse not to understand, when Jaruzelski extended the time of conscripts, that he was planning something against Solidarnosc. But the union did not even seriously protest. Yes, comrades—the union was demoralized, confused, and no longer under the clear authority of the leadership.

And how curious it is that Solidarnosc did not organize mass demonstrations and rallies in support of the police that wanted to join the union! Don't the comrades think that any half-witted idiots would have done so, if they were thinking of taking power?

Even if we are all lying, and the ex-SLers' information from the imperialist Press is accurate, wouldn't the comrades agree that if Solidarnosc had plans to take power, the Solidarnosc leaders' speeches would have to indicate that, at least somewhat? (We ask only for somewhat.) But instead, almost every word that came out of the mouth of the Solidarnosc leadership confirms the contentions we have made above.

On December 4, for example, nine days before the coup, Kuron said that the Stalinists would declare a state of emergency (Bulletin Solidarnosc, March 1982, page 29). He was absolutely right, of course. Solidarnosc's leadership knew what was coming. But according to his friend:

"In response to my arguments that that [state of emergency] would be impossible because the entire country would be brought to a halt, he replied that people were tired, they wanted peace, that it would be easy to terrorize them. He said: 'They will strike a little, but then they will back off.'" (Bulletin Solidarnosc, March 1982, page 29)

Not exactly the words of someone who was preparing to take power! But nevertheless a very honest description of the mood of the majority of the ranks within Solidarnosc.

Only a minority within the proletariat—the most politically advanced minority, which was moving to the left—was thinking about confrontation with the Stalinists, in the form of active strikes. The rest of the Solidarnosc ranks *WERE FED UP WITH THE SOLIDARNOSC LEADERSHIP*, and a great portion of them were looking forward to some solution from the Stalinists. Not martial law, perhaps, but a strong and firm government that would resolve the economic problems. The SL's talk of capitalist restoration was, in the last analysis, horseshit. We hope that the comrades can see that by now.

Kuron himself was always true to his reform Stalinist strategy of negotiation. He maintained it even six months after the coup! These reformists never learn anything! In a debate within Solidarnosc after the coup, he wrote that:

"National agreement is a necessary condition for a peaceful life, and has to be based on an acceptance by all citizens [the bureaucracy are citizens too, of course!] of at least some fundamental values and aims.... For the sake of compromise Poles generally accepted the decisive role of such people [the bureaucracy]. We asked only for social control over their actions.... The resistance movement, well organised and widely based, is the only chance for Poles. Only such a movement can be a party to a compromise." (Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, Summer 1982, pp. 18-19)

He concluded that "For many years in my activity in the opposition I argued against all kinds of violence. It's my duty now to say that I consider preparation to eliminate the occupation through mass demonstrations [not uprising—just another mass demonstration!] is a minor [!!] necessary evil." (Ibid.)

How nicely said! The centrist Zbigniew Kowalewski answered him politely that:

"Kuron's idea, then, explicitly involves a war of movement based on a strategy of overthrow.

After the overthrow of the military dictatorship ('liquidation of the occupation'), however, the Polish revolution will once again have to limit itself and refrain from overthrowing bureaucratic rule. Its aim should be to force the regime into a compromise with civil society." (Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, Summer 1982, pp. 21-22)

Even if the SL's paranoia were justified—even if the 'moderates' were just mouthing empty phrases about 'national agreement', 'compromises', etc., while they were 'secretly' preparing a bloody counterrevolution—why, for God's sake, did the central leader of the KOR KEEP ON singing compromises and 'I love you moderate Stalinists' AFTER the military took over? If the KOR really wanted to overthrow the bureaucracy, there was no need to keep maneuvering after the coup. The movement was smashed. The right wing, for example, felt free to reveal its true capitalist restorationist program, via Bujak. But not the 'moderates'—no!—they had never hidden their program to begin with.

"But what about the Random tapes?" the ex-SLers will probably exclaim. This, they argue, is proof that the Solidarnosc leadership was planning to take power.

What about them? We have already expressed our extreme concern that the comrades of the ex-SL use Stalinist and imperialist propaganda as their main source of information. The December 3-4 meeting was distorted by the Stalinists to begin with. They played only 20 minutes of a meeting that lasted for many hours. The participants themselves claimed later that important parts were cut out, and sentences were taken out of content.

And in any event, what was said at the meeting did not contradict anything that the Solidarnosc leadership had said before. They knew that the military takeover was coming, they were nervous, and some of them were panicking because they were running out of time. But even taking the distorted tapes at face value, they do not show that the leadership planned, at that meeting, to take power or seriously to confront the Stalinists.

The SL and the Stalinist propaganda machines used to quote one sentence from the meeting as the 'decisive' proof—Walesa's statement that "Confrontation is inevitable and it will take place." (Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1981)

But what did this really mean, given the circumstances? Walesa knew that the Stalinists were preparing to crush Solidarity in the near future. And it was obvious that unless a compromise were agreed on, some confrontation would take place. In fact, what Walesa wanted was to avoid it, and reach a working compromise on behalf of the Church. (He did not know, of course, that the Church was secretly contemplating giving its support to martial law, as the only alternative to the instability that would result from the workers breaking farther away from the Solidarnosc leadership!) Look at what Walesa said in the very next paragraph:

"Obviously, a general strike today would be a stupid act, and things should be done differently [An interesting break in the tape. What did he say that the Stalinists did not want to broadcast?] At the same time, I believe that we must not let ourselves be carried away by imagination and excitement, because if we did that we could again get a bloody nose." (Ibid.)

This are not the words of a man who was preparing to take power. They are the words of a man who knew that time was short, and who was desperately trying to convince everyone not to make it even shorter by calling a general strike. He knew that the leadership had lost authority, and that the only cards left were negotiation and compromise.

The Comrades keep on telling us that Walesa was just trying to buy time, while he was preparing to take power. Really? Let's take a closer look at what the leadership did in the last week or two before the coup.

In the last two weeks before the coup, the masses were moving to the left as we showed before; the centrists' active strike idea was gaining mass support inside the factories. These pro-socialist centrist forces were the only ones who wanted confrontation in the form of active strikes. According to a Solidarnosc poll in Lodz, for example:

"88.3% of those interviewed stated that they will actively support the union leadership, whatever the dangers involved, if it decides on action to confront the authorities for the purpose of achieving the demands of August 1980. The active strike is the form of confrontation most frequently mentioned." (The Polish Revolution: Solidarnosc, page 260)

But Walesa—yes, Walesa—declared 6 days after the Random tapes, and three days before the coup, that:

"I declare with my full authority: we are for agreement ... we do *not* want confrontation. The National Agreement must become a reality" (stowo Powszechne, Dec. 12, 1981)

As we'll see soon, Walesa did not change his position, even on the day of the military takeover.

Due to the enormous tension that was developing—everyone knew time was running out—the leadership did call for a referendum on 'the authorities' method of government' and free elections to the Sejm. But they did not threaten to use the muscle of the working class to force this demand on the bureaucracy.

In the LTT/BT discussion last year, Comrade Riley, who relied almost exclusively on the imperialist media, made it his *BIG POINT* that Solidarnosc was preparing a general strike on December 17 to enforce the referendum, and therefore it was necessary to crush it. Once again he is wrong. The Stalinists and the imperialist media totally distorted the call and what was discussed in the Random tapes.

The actual call was issued in the Mazowsze region on December 6. Solidarnosc called for:

"a day of protest against the use of force to solve social conflicts' on 17 December, the twelfth anniversary of the authorities' use of force against workers on the Baltic coast. The demonstrations, declared the resolution, should begin at 16.00 hrs—that is, after normal working hours. They called on other regions to join the protest action." (AS, no. 58, p.201 (quoted in *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity*, pp. 246-47))

So, contrary to the propaganda that the comrades received from the Stalinists and the CIA (which had every reason to lie), what Solidarnosc called for was merely a *ONE DAY PROTEST DEMONSTRATION ON DECEMBER 17, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEGUN AFTER WORKING HOURS*. How absurd! Is that the way a serious capitalist restorationist leadership would prepare itself to take power? No, comrades—the Solidarnosc leadership was even at these last hours trying to defuse any independent movement that could lead to the overthrow of the Stalinist bureaucracy; i.e., it was laying the red carpet for the smashing of the union.

If you are still not convinced, read the last issue of Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Solidarity Weekly). On December 11, *TWO DAYS BEFORE THE COUP*, it published an open appeal to the bureaucracy. The appeal—which was called 'Who blocked the Gdansk Accords?'—outlined the general line of the majority within the National Commission. The Solidarnosc leadership complained that:

"The precondition and basis for the social agreement reached in August 1980 was the principle that the difficult problems facing Poland would not be resolved through force or threat of force. Behind the phrase, "talking as one Pole to another", is the idea of abstaining from violence and threats. And yet we heard from the party's sixth plenum that the government would be given extraordinary powers by Parliament that would limit civil rights and forbid strikes. *THESE ARE NOT SIMPLY WORDS. THEY ARE PREPARATIONS.*"

Then, complaining about the repression of the students at the Firemen's Training Academy, they continue:

"...Do such maneuvers in the center of Warsaw lead to social agreement? Taken together with the cutting of telephone and telex lines in the headquarters of Warsaw Solidarity and the *Solidarity Weekly*, do such measures reach out for concord and cooperation? How can a call for extraordinary powers be justified?" (Bulletin Solidarnosc, March 1982, page 8)

Extraordinary! Jaruzelski closed down Solidarnosc's newspapers and was beginning to cut the telephone and telex lines in the country. And what did our 'restorationist' friends do and say? Did they organise any resistance at all? No! they cried, wept, and bowed before the Stalinists, and humbly reminded them that:

"The truth is that there have been far fewer protests and strikes in recent months. The people, depressed and condemned to waiting in lines, have shown a great deal of patience and calm. The appeals of Solidarity's leadership [not to strike] are working." (Ibid.)

Oh yes! no doubt! The appeals of Solidarity's leadership not to strike were working!! This allowed Jaruzelski all the time he needed to prepare for the coup. 'We stopped the workers just for you!', they pleaded before the Stalinists. 'Please, good Stalinists,' they cried, 'don't betray us, don't crush the movement altogether!'

The philosophy of Solidarnosc up to the moment that the coup started was very simple: 'We'll stop the possibility of a genuine political revolution, and you, Stalinists, will give us some advisory rule through the means of the National Accord'. *AND ALTHOUGH THEY KNEW VERY WELL THAT THE CRUSH WAS COMING, THEY DID NOT PUT A SINGLE BULLET IN A SINGLE RIFLE.* If all the bourgeois counterrevolutionary forces were like that, the BT with its current number of members could start the international revolution!

Hours before his arrest, Walesa gave his last speech to the National Commission. It was not the militant speech of someone who was preparing resistance, but a farewell speech by someone who felt that he had been betrayed by his 'secret' partners (the Stalinists), who refused to compromise.

"Of course," he said, "we proposed a different law. I don't know if you know, but I protested [good heavens!]. We proposed another law which said that, although we'd accept a suspension of the right to strike in certain conditions, it would not be possible to raise prices, dissolve the union and close everything down." (Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, Spr. 1982, page 30)

So, just a few hours before his arrest, he was whining about his last attempt at compromise—which, of course, did not work out. The union, he said, would have supported a law that would prohibit strikes, if the Stalinists would only have allowed the union to function. Can a sane Marxist really believe that these were the words of a man who, at the time, constituted a 'capitalist counterrevolutionary danger'?

We have tried to show, in the clearest possible manner, that the question of defense of the workers' state was not posed directly—indeed, it was hardly posed at all. What was posed was the question of the defense of the rights of the working class against the brutal attacks of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The SL's methodology is so crude that in the entire Workers Vanguard, one could not find a single word about the actual reformist role of the Solidarnosc leadership. Yet it is highly unlikely that the SL knew nothing about it.

In my opinion, it was completely deliberate that they downplayed the compromising role of Walesa and company. At the time, Robertson kept his sick cult going by proclaiming that the only principle that makes one's life worth living is the defense of the USSR (and the other workers' states). WV even went to the absurd extreme of proclaiming that American soup lines were part of Reagan's war drive against the Soviet Union. To maintain their loyalty to the cult, the most important thing for the SL members was to stand behind the Stalinists' tanks, which was, at the time, the big test for the 'defense' slogan. It is for these reasons that WV, under the direction of Robertson, deliberately falsified and concealed basic information from the SL membership. The falsification and distortion of WV are equivalent, on a small scale, to the Stalin School of falsification. The SL's position on Poland was not just a centrist confusion, but a deliberate crime, and a treason against the Polish working class.

In the next chapter, we'll deal with civil war. But first we'd like to say, in closing, that without the collaboration of the Solidarnosc leadership before the coup, the Stalinists could not have regained power so easily. The brilliantly executed coup of Jaruzelski could not have been that brilliant without the help of Walesa and company. It was the profound demoralisation and directionlessness of millions of workers, on the eve of the coup, that allowed Jaruzelski to cut through the movement like a knife cutting soft butter.

I. What civil war?

As Marxists we take sides in major confrontations. The SL, with their sectarian method, took away all the meaning from this basic Marxist understanding. The teaching of the SL is that one either 'defends' the workers' state, or sides with the restorationist leadership of Solidarnosc. In Poland, according to the SL and the ex-SLers, there was no third alternative.

Let us first examine what 'taking sides' means. When Marxists talk about taking sides, it is usually in reference to a war. In an anti-imperialist war, and even a civil war against fascism, the proletariat has to take a military side regardless of the leadership. But in order to take a side—*there must be a civil war*. A war means *two opposing armies* which are organized independently from one another. Each army is supposed to have, at least, military commanders, *weapons*, and military and political plans to win and take power or remain in power. These are only the minimum requirements. Every example in history illustrates this very clearly.

In Spain, for example, there were two armies—the fascist army and the popular front army. Each one had military and political commanders, territories, *and weapons with which to wage a real civil war*. The Left Opposition sided militarily with the popular front, because victory for the fascists would have meant the total destruction of the proletariat organizations.

None of the elementary requirements for civil war existed in Poland around the time of the December 13 military takeover. As we showed clearly before, the Solidarnosc leadership did not want to take power; therefore, Solidarnosc did not have political and military commanders. Moreover, *it did not have weapons*. There were no preparations at all for civil war. These are just the plain facts, comrades.

What followed the December 13 coup can be explained very simply by any bourgeois military expert. One doesn't have to understand the ABC's of Marxist logic to grasp that when there is no wall—the wall isn't there! And when there is no civil war—the civil war isn't there!

Solidarnosc as a coordinated movement with military commanders and weapons did not shoot a single shot back at the Stalinists. The ease with which the Stalinists were able to impose martial law resembles nothing so much as the ease with which the cow is slaughtered by the butcher. Solidarnosc's leadership was not a professional restorationist leadership which prepared seriously for a civil war—on the contrary, they disarmed the movement and led the membership to the Stalinists' slaughterhouse.

The resistance that came after the military takeover had nothing to do with a civil war. While there were significant pockets of resistance in some factories and mines, *they were spontaneous, leaderless, and without any national and usually even any regional coordination. The resistance was weaponless, and it was totally passive and defensive*. The workers at most went on strike against the imposition of martial law. In no case did they go beyond protests and take the offensive, or even try to stop martial law by military resistance—not to mention taking power from the Stalinist bureaucracy! The resistance was nothing more than the minimum reaction of the oppressed against the oppressor.

The demands of the resistance were also minimal. They merely asked for the end of martial law and the freedom of the arrested Solidarnosc activists. Due to the betrayal by the leadership, none of the previous demands for the self-management bodies, or even 'free elections' to the Sejm and sharing power, were raised. The only thing that the demoralised Solidarnosc membership asked for was that the Stalinist bureaucracy ease their oppression somewhat—i.e., stop martial law and allow Solidarnosc to function again.

Such demands were a must for Trotskyists to support, because the defense of the workers' state was not posed on December 13. What was posed was the defense of the democratic rights of the working class against the bureaucracy. It was very clear that not only the workers, but even the Solidarnosc leadership, were at best offering just minimum resistance. On December 21, 1981—eight days after the imposition of martial law—the Solidarnosc leadership issued a document entitled 'The Basic Principles of Opposition', calling for passive resistance. The call itself is a fundamental admission of defeat. It included the following among its points of resistance:

"6. Work slowly, complain about the mess which surrounds you and about the inefficiency of your supervisors, leave all decision making to the commissars and informers, overwhelm them with questions, voice your uncertainties, don't think for them, always play ignorant.

"7. Don't pre-empt the decisions of commissars and informers by being subservient. All the dirty work must be done by them alone. In this way you are creating a void around them, by inundating them with the most trivial matters you will make the army/Police machine split at the seams.

"8. Stick religiously to the most idiotic instructions, don't solve problems—leave that to the commissars and informers; a senseless rule is your ally

"9. If you are told to break any contradictory rules, demand that the order be put in writing, complain about it, prolong the whole process. Sooner or later the commissar will want to be left in peace--THAT WILL BE THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF DICTATORSHIP.

"10. Take as much compassionate leave as you can.

"11. Avoid social gatherings, have nothing to do with the zealous worker; the informer; the commissar and all others like them.

....

"15. Paint slogans, paste up posters and handbills--circulate uncensored publications--BUT ALWAYS WITH DUE CARE.

"16. When organising use the old principles of conspiracy work. I KNOW ONLY WHAT I SHOULD KNOW--REMEMBER THAT TODAY THERE IS NOTHING MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE FIGHT FOR THE RELEASE OF INTERNEES, THE FIGHT TO END THE STATE OF WAR: CITIZENS LIBERTIES AND UNION RIGHTS.

"WE SHALL WIN"

The Opposition Union

"Solidarity" (Information Bulletin, published by the

"Solidarity" Trade Union working in the U.K., 1 March 1982)

Yes, comrades--suggestions for slow-downs and caution are not methods to win a military civil war, but minimal and below minimal methods of passive resistance. *Therefore it was the duty of Trotskyists to stand with the Polish working class, and not only to denounce martial law, but also--as long as the restorationist leadership was not leading a real civil war against the bureaucracy--to support the strikes and other resistance to martial law.* Unless there is a direct uprising by restorationist forces to restore capitalism, Communists always choose the working class against the bureaucracy. On December 13, there was no danger of such an uprising, and the defense of the working class organizations against the Stalinist bureaucracy was thus the prime task of Trotskyists.

The SL told us, at the time, that revolutionaries could not have a third alternative and choose the defense of the working class. This general method of thinking--that we have to choose between two reactionary solutions, the restorationist sector of Solidarnosc or the Stalinists--is totally foreign to the Marxist method of thinking and being. Since the SL identifies the entire Polish working class with the restorationist leadership, the SL had to conclude that Solidarnosc was a CIA Union. If that had really been the case, we probably would have agreed with the SL, and supported the suppression of the Union. But with such an idiotic and sectarian method of thinking, one might as well close up shop and join the degenerate cult activities of Jim Robertson--which result, by the way, from the same logic as the SL's position on the Polish Revolution.

The SL's method of thinking, which imagines that the leadership's long term restorationist goal necessitates the suppression of the entire working class, together with all of its organs to organize for the political revolution, reflects a profound cynicism as to the potential for any revolutionary process on our planet. *It is precisely for this reason that Poland is such a big issue of principle.*

II. *Should Solidarnosc have been smashed, or defended?*

The comrades from the SL keep on repeating to us that martial law was not the central question on December 13. This is not a big surprise to us, since they refuse to oppose martial law. But to some degree they are right. The central question on December 13 was not martial law, but the democratic rights of the Polish working class. Martial law was just the means that the Stalinist bureaucracy used to smash working class rights. For the ex-LTters, the central question in the debate is the ex-SLers' support for the suppression of Solidarnosc. Even if the ex-SLers supported the use of means other than martial law to suppress Solidarnosc, it would not matter. The principled differences between us would remain the same.

On the question of martial law, we must once again try to apply logic. You do not support (and do not oppose!!) martial law, but (and what a but!!) you do support the dismantling (i.e., smashing) of Solidarnosc. The Stalinist bureaucracy used martial law to achieve the goal that you support. That was indeed the safest way to guarantee it. The SL was honest. But you are not, comrades. Like guilty liberals, you say: 'We support the goal (smashing Solidarnosc), but we do not support nor oppose the bloody means used to achieve it!!' This reminds us of the liberal pacifists who support the goals of the imperialists but 'do not support' the means used to achieve them!! Martial law was the best and safest way to smash the union. The Stalinists were not stupid—they knew that no partial means could succeed in dismantling Solidarnosc. Therefore, your arguments for being neither for nor against martial law do not hold any water, as long as you support the suppression of Solidarnosc. Any half-serious person who understands some formal logic can pop your arguments like a needle can pop a balloon. Yes! Unfortunately, your arguments—neither for nor against martial law—are full of hot air, with very little serious substance.

In Comrade Riley's contribution to the discussion (that I just received and I will answer in detail later), he wrote that "Examples [of measures to suppress Solidarnosc that the BT could support] are freedom of the press, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and/or the severing of lines of communication and transportation." (BT Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol.5, No.4, pp. 20) Comrade Riley tells us that he, in fact, support all the measures of martial law, but not martial law itself—because it would have embarrassed the BT to have been associated with the Stalinists politically. The example that he uses of Trotsky not supporting the budget of the Popular Front in Spain does not hold water, because the Left Opposition supported the military measures of the Popular Front against the Fascists. Let's remind the comrades once again—martial law was the military means used by the Stalinists to achieve the political goal of smashing Solidarnosc. To the best of our knowledge, the ex-SLers still support this political goal.

In 1981, the SL wrote that "We take responsibility in advance for whatever idiocies and atrocities they [the Stalinists] will commit." This was the ultimate result of the SL's politics and methodology. You, comrades of the ex-SL, do not agree with this. You do not take responsibility for the Stalinists' atrocities. But comrade Smith was right when he said that his differences with the SL are cosmetic. The ex-SLers support the central line of the SL in Poland, which is the suppression of Solidarnosc and the Polish working class. The SL wrote the above line because it knew what the Stalinists' actions meant. And in order to justify their criminal position, they had to take more responsibility than the Stalinists themselves were ready to take. But disagreement with the worst aspects of the SL's position will not make the BT's politics on Poland substantially different, unless it changes its position on the central line of Spartacism on Poland.

As long as there was no civil war between restorationist forces and the Stalinist bureaucracy, the preservation of Solidarnosc would have kept the possibility of the political revolution alive. The contradiction between the membership and the leadership undoubtedly would have polarized further. We stand for the defense of the democratic rights of the working class in the deformed workers' state, not because we are liberal and support workers' democracy in and of itself, but because workers' democracy is the only available tool that the working class has to achieve the political revolution. Poland was the best example to illustrate it.

By suppressing Solidarnosc, the bureaucracy not only suppressed the organisational means by which the Polish proletariat could carry on its struggles against it. It also suppressed the two million CP-ers who had waged a gigantic struggle for workers' democracy inside the CP. As we clearly showed before, the vanguard for the political revolution—the CP rank-and-file—organized itself against the bureaucracy inside Solidarnosc. The bureaucracy also suppressed the substantial number of rank-and-filers who considered themselves socialists, and wanted to smash Stalinism and bring workers'

democracy via the active strike. These workers did not support the election of bourgeois parties to the Sejm, but called for workers' bodies—self-management—to control the country. Support for the suppression of Solidarnosc meant support for the suppression of the entire self-management movement, which at the time was polarizing and moving in a direction that definitely was favorable for Trotskyists.

It is for these reasons, comrades, that we perceive your support for the smashing of Solidarnosc as an open stand against the possibility of the political revolution. The Transitional Program states that:

"A fresh upsurge of the the revolution in the USSR will undoubtedly begin under the banner of the struggle against *social inequality* and *political oppression*. Down with the privileges of the bureaucracy! Down with Stakhanovism! Down with the Soviet aristocracy and its ranks and orders! Greater equality of wages for all forms of labor!

"The struggle for the freedom of the trade unions and the factory committees, for the right of assembly and freedom of the press, will unfold in the struggle for the regeneration and development of *Soviet democracy*." (Documents of the Fourth International, page 213)

As the Transitional Program states clearly, the struggles for workers' democracy and Soviet democracy are both integral parts of the political revolution.

In the fall of 1981, the Polish Revolution entered its second stage. After its limited success in achieving workers' democracy, the question that was posed was Soviet democracy versus bourgeois democracy. Solidarnosc was increasingly being polarized over this question. The main task of Trotskyists was to demand genuine Soviet democracy. It was necessary to call for the formation of Soviets by the workers' councils and the self-management movement.

Whether they should have been assembled in the Sejm or not was a tactical question. If so, it was also necessary to use once again the method of the Transitional Program, which the SL totally forgot about, and to demand that the restorationist elements and the Stalinists be driven out of it. If the workers wanted the Soviets to be constructed through the control of the Sejm by workers' organizations, very well—the center of our campaign in Poland would have been to kick the supporters of capitalist restoration—and the Stalinist bureaucracy—out of such bodies. In the fall of 1981, when the centrist left demanded "Soviets in the lower bodies of the Sejm, and the bureaucracy in the upper chamber", we should have said "Only one chamber. Kick out the bureaucracy and the restorationists! Only genuine workers' representatives who support the foundation of the workers' state and workers' democracy should be allowed into the Sejm." In this way, the Trotskyists could have exposed the inadequacy of the reform Stalinists and the centrists, and could have led the second stage of the political revolution in Poland.

We would, of course, have been using the method of the Transitional Program, which states:

"The bureaucracy replaced the soviets as class organs with the fiction of universal electoral rights—in the style of Hitler-Goebbels. It is necessary to return to soviets not only their free democratic form but also their class content. As once the bourgeoisie and kulaks were not permitted to enter the soviets, so now *it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy and the new aristocracy out of the soviets*. In the soviets there is room only for representatives of the workers, rank-and-file collective farmers, peasants, and Red Army men .

"Democratization of the soviets is impossible without *legalization of soviet parties*. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognise as soviet parties." (Documents of the Fourth International, page 213)

Yes, Comrades, by supporting the suppression of Solidarnosc, you supported the suppression of legalization of soviet parties—including a Trotskyist party. The crushing of Solidarnosc stopped the "Democratization of the Soviets" and the basis for this, which is the "legalization of soviet parties." The Stalinists could not tolerate the development of legalization and democratization of soviet parties. But this was the direction in which the Polish events were unfolding.

The Stalinists smashed Solidarnosc, not because its leadership was preparing a counterrevolutionary capitalist restorationist attack (as we have proved very clearly, they supported the bureaucracy), but because the leadership could not prevent the polarization that was developing within Solidarnosc. Therefore, support for the smashing of Solidarnosc was support for the smashing of the political

revolution, and it was a crime of historic proportions.

In no country was the process of the political revolution so deep—and yes, comrades—so contradictory. Uneven and combined development is the essence of life (they didn't teach you that in the SL!). The crushing of Solidarnosc was a big defeat for the working class. Almost six years after Solidarnosc was crushed, the working class's fear of the bureaucracy is still felt throughout the Soviet bloc. The smashing of the Polish working class will likely delay new developments toward the political revolution in Eastern Europe for years and possibly decades.

We must end with the sad note, that unless we achieve clarity concerning what a political revolution is, and how it happened in Poland, we probably will stand on opposite sides of the barricades when such a revolution develops again. Unless strong Trotskyist parties arise in the deformed workers' states, Poland will most likely be the model for other countries. The development of the political revolution will not be pure. There will be contradictory programs and trajectories of different tendencies, with restorationist tendencies undoubtedly being represented.

Another deep problem with the sectarian method that the ex-SLers inherited from the SL is the notion that a precondition for the defense of the Polish proletariat against the bureaucracy was the presence of a sizable Trotskyist party. The comrades from the SL said several times 'But there was not a Trotskyist party there'—and that therefore the movement had to fall into restorationist hands. We believe that such a way of thinking represented a deep cynicism. As we have seen, the real result of the lack of a Trotskyist vanguard was that all the sectors of Solidarnosc's leadership—the restorationists, the reform Stalinists, and the Church—all joined the Stalinists against the process of the political revolution. But the idea that the absence of a revolutionary party drove *THE ENTIRE WORKING CLASS* toward restoration is completely foreign to the dialectic method of thinking, and pragmatic through and through. The heart of the differences between us is the same differences that Trotsky had with the minority in the factional fight within the SWP in 1940. We believe that the comrades do not understand the dialectic method of thinking.

Since the Trotskyist movement is practically non-existent, those who claim that the consequence is the inevitable triumph of bourgeois reaction should not support any revolution. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland itself (in previous years)—the working class was crushed because the subjective factor was missing. The question that we are discussing is not whether or not there was a Trotskyist party to lead the revolutionary process to its conclusion, nor are we really discussing what were the best transitional demands at a given stage. What the discussion between us is really about is whether the solution for the working class in Poland was the political revolution, or the boots of the Stalinist bureaucracy.