

# Labor's Next Chance: What American Workers Can Learn from the 1930s

**As a result of the international crisis of capitalism, attacks on the U.S. working class have become increasingly severe in the 1990s. The American bourgeoisie has taken the offensive through such measures as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the recent attempts to destroy traditionally militant unions like the United Auto Workers and the United Mine Workers of America. With the very existence of the largest American trade unions at stake, American workers must move beyond bread-and-butter demands and take a more militant stand to defend their hard-won gains. Events in the past have proven that if we do not fight back, we will face even greater setbacks as the economic crisis worsens.**

Despite decades of low levels in the American class struggle, it is more than likely that the working class will fight back once again, as it has begun to do in Europe (see "European Workers Fight Back," p. 23). Recent strikes such as those waged by the Summit Hospital workers in Oakland, California (see "Only Militant Strikes Can Win," *International Trotskyist* #6) and the coal miners of the Midwest (see "Silent Death or Militant Fight? The Plight of the UMW," *International Trotskyist* #8) have already shown that the working class is not willing to stand idly by when faced with more and more cutbacks.

However, unless American workers take *independent political action, using militant, class struggle methods*, their struggles will only lead to more betrayals at the hands of the union bureaucrats and the Democratic Party. The fight for basic rights such as jobs, health care, child care, and education will not go anywhere unless the struggle for these demands is linked to the struggle against capitalism and its two twin parties — the Democratic and the Republican Parties. The first step toward political independence is the formation of a militant labor party based on militant rank-and-file committees such as strike committees or councils of shop stewards. Such committees *in struggle* can link the *political* program of a labor party to the militant struggles of the workers and the unions.

We need only to look back at our own history, to the last time when capitalism entered a severe crisis, in order to see how class struggle methods can lead to real gains for the working class. The American ruling class would rather keep silent about the Great Depression, when the organized labor movement grew almost overnight and hundreds of thousands of workers took matters into their own hands. They would prefer that we forget about the real threats posed to private property when workers engaged in sit-down strikes and fought hand-to-hand with the police, because these methods placed the struggle against the bourgeoisie at the forefront of the labor movement in the 1930s. Similarly, today's union bureaucrats would rather not be reminded that their own methods of class collaboration and stifling of independent labor political action hark back to this crucial time in the American class struggle.

It is up to us to look back at the great struggles of the 1930s to teach us what methods to use — and what mistakes we can avoid — in the 1990s. History has already proven that without *independent political action*, the American working class will continue to suffer more defeats no matter how militantly the struggle is waged.

## The Great Strikes of 1934

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933, his New Deal reforms were passed by Congress amidst a wave of strikes (1,695 total in 1933) and demonstrations all over the country. Jobless estimates soared as high as 18 million, and the unemployed formed their own organizations to fight for food and cash relief. The majority of American workers remained unorganized, however. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), with a membership of less than three million skilled workers, did not embark on any type of mass organizing campaign during the worst days of the Great Depression. In fact, AFL President William Green spoke out *against* organizing the large pool of unskilled industrial workers. The AFL leaders, like the Roosevelt administration, feared the potential militancy of the American working class during hard times.

The AFL even discouraged strikes, but when they did occur the AFL bureaucrats sat at the bargaining table alongside company unions (unions that were set up by the companies and endorsed by the Roosevelt administration) which were given proportional representation on Roosevelt's bargaining committees, instead of leading the workers through independent struggles for their own unions. The AFL leaders urged striking workers back to work without fighting for any gains, including union recognition! These weak, capitulationist methods played into the hands of the Democratic administration, which smashed strike after strike through court injunctions and armed violence against the workers.

It was in 1934, in the wake of these strike defeats, that militant workers in Toledo, Minneapolis, and San Francisco demonstrated the effectiveness of independent action combined with class struggle methods. By relying on their own resources in direct confrontation with the bosses and the state, these workers paved the way to union recognition for millions of American workers. They also won hiring halls, wage increases, and shorter work days.

## Toledo Auto-Lite

When workers in Toledo, Ohio struck in the spring of 1934, a committee of strikers appealed to a group called the Unemployed League for assistance. A.J. Muste's Unemployed League had organized a series of militant mass demonstrations and marches in 1933 to win cash relief for the unemployed in

Toledo, and they called for *unity between the employed and the unemployed, encouraging the latter to help all strikes instead of scabbing*. Workers at the Toledo Auto-Lite company first went on strike after they joined AFL Federal Local 18384 in February, 1934, but the union went nowhere when AFL leaders entered a truce agreement with government negotiators to end the strike. In April, the Toledo Auto-Lite workers formed an *independent strike committee* in coordination with the Unemployed League to lead a second strike on April 13, 1934. These were the first crucial steps taken in a very militant, hard-won strike.

Despite federal court injunctions, the Toledo Auto-Lite workers brought 10,000 people out onto the picket lines on May 23. Individual pickets were constantly harassed and attacked by the police. When the cops tried to escort scabs past the pickets, the strikers fought back with strategically placed piles of bricks and stones. They threw tear gas canisters and made slingshots to turn out the lights inside the factory and frighten the scabs once they were inside. The police eventually retreated and the pickets surrounded the factory, keeping the scabs inside until the National Guard showed up to get them out.

But the 900 armed National Guardsmen could not scare away the militant strikers, who greatly outnumbered them. For six days, strikers fought the National Guard with fists and bricks, and surrounded the soldiers from all sides to demoralize and distract them. Some of the strikers even tried to win over the soldiers by explaining why they were on strike. Nevertheless, the National Guard shot at the strikers at point-blank range on May 24; they killed two strikers and wounded twenty-five. Six thousand strikers kept fighting back and put some of the soldiers in the hospital. The troops withdrew on May 31 when the Toledo Auto-Lite Company closed the plant.

On June 1, 1934, 98 AFL unions voted for a general strike in Toledo. 40,000 workers turned out for a rally at the courthouse square, but instead of supporting a general strike, the AFL leaders reassured the workers that Roosevelt would aid them. With thousands of workers supporting the strike, a weak promise could not end it. The Toledo Auto-Lite company finally capitulated on June 4, granting Local 18384 a six-month contract and a 5% wage increase. The victorious workers organized 19 other plants before 1935. By summoning the help of the unemployed to lead the strike, using *armed pickets* to block the factory, and ignoring the false promises of the union bureaucrats, the Toledo workers gained valuable experience that would help them bring the General Motors Corporation to its knees three years later.

### Minneapolis Teamsters

The workers in Toledo were not the only ones on strike in early 1934. That same February, in Minneapolis, truck drivers in Local 574 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, aided by a group of Trotskyists, organized a strike that started in the coal yards and eventually reached out to organize all truck drivers in the area. The Minneapolis strikers demonstrated how *mobile pickets* (called "cruising pickets") could also be used as an effective method of struggle. Striking truckers covered the entire city, making sure that no scab-driven goods came through, and assembled at strategic points to keep the city blocked off. The Teamsters organized 3,000 new members, but by May the local employers still had not recognized the union.

On May 15, 1934, a second strike was meticulously organized with the help of class struggle fighters in the Communist League of America (the precursor of the American Socialist Workers Party). Like the Toledo workers, they summoned the aid of the unemployed. A large garage served as strike headquarters, where dispatchers communicated with the cruising pickets, food was cooked and served, and doctors waited to tend to injured strikers. The workers were kept up to date on the latest events in the strike through an *independent, striker-run newspaper* called the *Daily Organizer*. The *Daily Organizer* was criticized by Leon Trotsky because it provided only logistical information with no political program, but it was a logistically useful alternative to the local bourgeois press. As in Toledo, confrontations with the police were militant and bloody. In the famous "Battle of Deputies Run," strikers chased police and local deputies out of the City Market on May 21-22.

By May 25, local employers agreed to recognize the union, but they stalled on any concrete acknowledgment until the truckers struck a third time on July 16. This time the police trapped some of the pickets and then opened fire, killing two workers and wounding 55 others. In response, unionized taxi drivers and other truck drivers, who had been operating with the permission of the union, also went on strike. Minnesota Governor Floyd Olsen declared martial law, but the cruising pickets kept the police and National Guard busy for several weeks to follow. As mass demonstrations were called in support of the strikers, the militant strike leaders refused to capitulate to government mediators at the bargaining table. The bosses finally gave in and signed a contract on August 22, 1934.

### San Francisco Maritime Workers

Another large and militant strike was called by the AFL International Longshoremen's Association in San Francisco on May 9, 1934. 25,000 workers, including sympathy strikers, demanded coast-wide union recognition, a union-run hiring hall, a closed shop, and a wage increase for maritime workers. Like the Toledo and Minneapolis strikes, this strike was organized and fought by the rank and file despite the attempts of the AFL leaders to bring it to a halt. The strikers fought back against attacks from the shipowners' thugs, police, and vigilante groups. On July 5, police used tear gas, pistols, and shotguns to kill two strikers and injure 109 others. Workers in San Francisco responded to these killings by calling a *general strike*, which shut down the city for two days. Strikers took on municipal tasks such as directing traffic until the AFL called off the general strike.

After over 300 arrests and many violent attacks against strikers and left-wing groups, the strike ended on July 31, 1934. Hiring halls were opened up and down the West Coast within a year after the strike, which also led to the organization of East Coast maritime workers. In San Francisco, as in Minneapolis and Toledo, well-organized strike action was backed up with *mass demonstrations*, *sympathy strikes*, and *armed force*, which led to victory.

### The CIO: From Class Struggle to Class Collaboration

The three great strikes of 1934 demonstrated the effectiveness of class struggle methods and showed the need for a broad

organization that would encompass the majority of American workers. A little over a year after the end of the San Francisco strike, the pressure from below was so strong that it eventually split the AFL. In October 1935, United Mineworkers President John L. Lewis and other union leaders formed a committee "to encourage and promote organization of the workers in the mass production and unorganized industries." The formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) was a de facto split from the craft-minded AFL leaders, who officially expelled the CIO in 1938, at which time it was renamed the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

The formation of the CIO was a significant step forward. The craft-oriented unions in the AFL were very limited. Besides being geared toward the most privileged sectors of the working class, craft-based organizing involved having several different unions in one workplace, each of which cared only about its own narrow special interests. In contrast, the CIO was organizing on an industry-wide basis, which meant that all the workers were organized into one union at the point of production, regardless of their different job classifications. That was a big step forward, since it brought about more *unity* in militant actions. The potential political impact of the CIO was great. Having formed as a direct result of militant, independent workers' struggles, the CIO had the capacity to carry these struggles forward at a time when the workers were taking action but lacked clear political direction. Although its membership never surpassed six million in the 1930s, the CIO could have been the starting point for a *fighting labor party* in the United States.

Unfortunately, while Lewis was aware of the substantial

political weight of the CIO, he used this weight to try to win over President Roosevelt and the Democratic Party, instead of building an *independent, fighting workers' party*. While conducting mass organizing campaigns in the auto, steel and rubber industries in early 1936, Lewis and the other CIO leaders formed a group called the Labor Non-Partisan League. The LNPL and its New York affiliate, the American Labor Party, advocated the creation of a labor party, but instead of uniting hundreds of thousands of supporters (including many workers who traditionally voted for Communist or Socialist political candidates *instead of the Democrats*) around a *militant, anti-capitalist program*, the LNPL endorsed Roosevelt's re-election that fall!

Despite the sentiment for a real labor party within the working class and clearly within the ranks of the CIO, Lewis and the leaders of the CIO posed no real alternative to pressuring the Democratic administration for concessions. In fact, the CIO spread the illusion that they had some influence on the "friendly" labor policies of the Roosevelt administration. By supporting the President both politically and financially, they fostered false hopes that they could win the bourgeoisie over to their side. This contradiction between the class struggle methods that led to the creation of the CIO and the class collaboration of its leaders eventually *destroyed* the potential impact of the mass of newly-organized American workers. However, they did not give up the fight easily.

### Sit-Down Strikes in 1937

The United Auto Workers (UAW), which formed in Au-

## American Airlines Strike: Not a Victory for the Workers!

The conclusion of the recent strike by flight attendants at American Airlines (AA) has left the crucial issues facing these workers unresolved. The strike by the 21,000 union members and their strong show of solidarity cost AA \$10 million a day. But Clinton's intervention, and the labor misleaders who cheered it as a victory, left the workers with far short of what was needed to secure real gains. The union bureaucracy propped up illusions in Clinton's sincerity in addressing labor's concerns, while giving the workers nothing, not even promises. Clinton, however, does not give a damn about the flight attendants. This was clearly demonstrated when he went along with the Federal Aviation Administration's decision to slash the training time for scabbing flight attendants from 6 weeks to 10 days; if the strike resumes, AA's boss, Robert Crandall, could build up a scab force almost immediately, thanks to Clinton! By halting the momentum of the struggle, Clinton's intervention

defused a labor mobilization that could have grown to set an example for future working class actions in a manner similar to the Toledo, Minneapolis, and San Francisco strikes in 1934 (see accompanying article). Clinton did the airline bosses a favor, not the union, by stepping in; this is demonstrated by the fact that before the White House intervened, it called every major US airline to get their approval!

Airline workers in the US are fed up with the kind of capitulation by the union bureaucracies that destroyed the unions at Continental and Eastern after those airlines declared bankruptcy. Then and now, the only way out is to call for an industry-wide strike. The rank-and-file union workers are beginning to see that their choice is either to wage militant action or to lose the benefits of being in a union. "An injury to one is an injury to all" is one of the basic principles any trade union worth the name must carry out in action. In the case of the AA strike, solidarity actions

should have started with a full sympathy strike by the other unions in AA, starting with the pilots' union. While the pilots were willing to go on such a strike, and supported the flight attendants' picket lines in a big way, the union leaders torpedoed it, using the excuse that flying empty planes would cost AA more money — a short-term gain at the long-term cost of the important union principle of solidarity.


Those flight attendants who perceived Clinton's intervention as a victory for the workers will learn a bitter lesson about the trap of relying on federal arbitration in labor disputes. The government is not a class-neutral agency. Rather, it is run for the benefit of the owners of the industries. Any concessions from AA will be minor at best; whatever the airline gives with its left hand will be taken away by its right. Crandall and company have to lash out against the workers as the airline industry's profit margin grows leaner in this period of capitalist decline. Though the

gust, 1935 and joined the CIO a year later, was one of the most militant and democratic labor unions forged out of the struggles of the 1930s. Because some of its founders had gained valuable experience in the Toledo strikes of 1934, the UAW had a militant, rank-and-file orientation. At its founding convention in August, 1935, the UAW boasted of "confidence in the organized power of labor" and "no discrimination against members or prospective members because of color, creed, nationality, political belief or affiliation." They also declared "no trust in governmental boards and agencies . . . which, without exception, aid only the employers." With a goal of organizing *all* unorganized auto workers, the UAW called for the formation of an "International Union *controlled by the membership* with all officers, organizers, [and] executive boards democratically elected by the membership and subject to their recall." (Emphasis added—ed.) At its second convention in April-May of 1936, the UAW unanimously passed a resolution calling for the formation of a labor party. (John Lewis added a rider to this resolution that put the UAW's support behind Roosevelt in the 1936 Presidential election.)

Thus it is not surprising that the auto workers were at the center of the next wave of strikes that occurred in the winter of 1936-37, and that they popularized another successful strike tactic, the *sit-down strike*. By sitting down on the job and stopping all production, the auto workers (and later, workers in many other industries) took the property of the bosses directly into their own hands and confronted the issue of *who controls production*. The sit-down strikes of 1937 were effective because, like the mobile pickets of 1934, they were at the center of a series of well-organized tactics that involved centralized communication, food distribution, and workers' defense against the armed bodies of the state.

The first in a wave of sit-down strikes occurred in Flint, Michigan on November 13, 1936. Workers at the Fisher Body No. 1 plant won union recognition and inspired other factory occupations as the UAW signed up new members from Detroit to Atlanta. When the General Motors company ignored the requests of the CIO to join them at a collective bargaining conference the following December, strikes erupted in Cleveland, Flint, St. Louis, Kansas City, Toledo, and other cities in the General Motors network. 140,000 workers participated in the industry-wide strike, organized from Flint, Michigan, before it ended.

GM responded to the occupations and mass picketing outside the factories with an anti-picketing injunction in January 1937. They turned off the heat in Fisher Body Plant No. 2 on January 12 to try and freeze the strikers out, but instead the workers outside stormed through the line of police blocking




strike is over, AA's threats of layoffs, benefit cuts, and increased flight attendant workloads are not.

The fight is not finished. Soon after the strike ended, AA suspended 80 to 90 strikers, firing 15 of them for allegedly threatening other workers (that is, most likely, scabs). This is a direct shot at the fighting strength of the union. The union should demand their reinstatement and be prepared to fight back with labor actions if AA refuses.

History has shown that only independent, militant, class conscious counterattacks can secure any real gains for workers. In this era of economic decline, workers must expand beyond fighting over economic issues alone and,

instead, be prepared to challenge attacks on the working class by the bosses and the bosses' government. The issues that prompted this strike will not go away. The strike must resume in order for the workers to achieve victory.

When the arbitrators rule in favor of the bosses, as history shows they always will, the workers will learn not to put their trust in government agents. If the union is to put up a fight in the next round, it must be



prepared to follow the example of the Air France workers (see "European Workers Fight Back," p. 23) and shut down the airports completely through mass pickets and militant actions, regardless of any attempts at intervention by Clinton or his cronies.

the entrances, in order to get food in to the strikers. Lewis, who stood behind the strike, appealed to Roosevelt for help, and the President responded by asking the strikers to accept a one-month contract! When it became apparent that the strikers would not leave without a fight, Michigan Governor Frank Murphy sent 1,500 National Guardsmen into Flint to prepare to drive them out of the plants.


The workers stood fast despite more injunctions, tear gas, and the threat of armed force. They spread the strike by marching into other plants and calling on the workers to sit down on the spot, then barricading doors and windows to keep the cops out. This created more diversions and confusion for both the police and the National Guard.

Thousands of supporters from other automaking cities crowded the roads into Flint on February 3, and directed traffic when necessary. The city was sealed off by 1,300 National Guard reinforcements on February 9. General Motors, the National Guard, and the strikers reached a standstill. The Flint workers prepared an arsenal of weapons made during the strike to fight back if the National Guard was ordered to fire. In response to the desperate pleas of Governor Murphy (who hesitated to fire on the workers due to political pressure) and General Motors to call the strikers out of the plants, Lewis told the company to speak to them directly. Finally, on February 11, 1937, the company agreed to sign a six-month contract with the UAW.

By holding out and defending themselves to the end, the Flint workers showed once again that well-organized, militant strike tactics that encompassed the largest numbers possible and mobilized community support could put operations at a standstill and bring the bosses to their knees. Almost a half million workers used the effective sit-down method by the end of 1937.

### **A Lost Opportunity**

The General Motors strike, although it resulted in the organization of thousands of auto workers, was an isolated action that could have spread the struggle even farther. Had workers in other industries (steel, rubber, coal, etc.) initiated work stoppages in sympathy with the Flint strikers, they could have shut down the entire Midwest instead of just one company. The UAW, with its democratic tradition and militant rank and file organizers, could have formed the nucleus for a fighting labor party using the resources of the entire CIO. But because the GM strike lacked political direction, it led to a limited set of



**Longshore workers in the 1934 San Francisco general strike**

gains that were not linked to the crucial political struggle against capitalism itself.

The lack of a class struggle perspective in the CIO led to defeats for some American workers, such as those who participated in the terrible steel strike that followed the Flint sit-downs in the spring of 1937. Eighteen workers were shot and hundreds wounded in the furious battle between the steelworkers and the five largest U.S. Steel companies known as "Little Steel" (who did not recognize the steelworkers' union until 1941). The Little Steel Strike not only lacked political direction, but it was poorly organized. Rather than using the experiences in Flint to help the workers, Lewis and the CIO reassured the strikers that this time, the Roosevelt administration, National Guard, etc. would fight on their side. Instead they witnessed one of the most violent attacks on the American working class in U.S. history.

The Little Steel defeat was indicative of a greater loss for the American working class: a missed opportunity to build their own mass fighting organizations and confront the bosses in a struggle for power. The rapid rise of the CIO proves that events occur very rapidly in the class struggle, and that they must be used to full advantage when the time is ripe. John L. Lewis was never a class struggle fighter, and he kept trying to win over

President Roosevelt until he stepped down as CIO President in 1940. After finally losing faith in Roosevelt, Lewis did not move to the left; instead he endorsed the Republican Presidential candidate, Wendell Willkie, in the 1940 election. Without a class struggle perspective, Lewis had led a potentially great fighting workers' organization into a political dead end; he is responsible for tying the workers to the capitalist system and its parties — the Democratic and the Republican Parties.

### **For a Fighting Labor Party in the 1990s!**

The chance to build a real fighting labor party is not gone forever, however. In more recent struggles such as the Pittston miners' strike of 1989, American workers have demonstrated that they are still willing to use militant methods to defy reactionary labor laws and court injunctions. This sentiment is bound to grow as attacks on the gains of the 1930s continue. In one poll, 60% of unionists who were surveyed agreed that the time is ripe for building a labor party in the United States (see "How To Build a Labor Party: Our Approach to Labor Party Advocates," *International Trotskyist* #4), and the pressure is mounting. As recently as October 1993, the steering committee of Labor Party Advocates (mostly labor bureaucrats and union activists) called for a convention to meet in 1995 to found a labor party. But like the CIO, a labor party will not go anywhere unless it is genuinely controlled by the rank and file and backed by massive struggles of the labor unions that are taken beyond bread-and-butter demands. Today's workers must fight for:

**Jobs for all! Free education and health care on demand!  
For a sliding scale of wages and prices under workers' and consumers' control!**

American capitalism has entered its deepest crisis since the 1930s, a crisis that has resulted in a fundamental restructuring and relocation of production all over the world. Unless workers combine *political* action with the militant methods of the 1930s — sit-down strikes, mass picketing, strike committees, fighting in the streets, etc. — during this period of economic decline, they will suffer greater setbacks than their predecessors in the CIO, who benefited from the slight economic upturns of the 1930s. (See "Only Militant Strikes Can Win," *International Trotskyist* #6.) Today the unions resemble what Roosevelt and the bosses of his day would have liked them to be: docile unions that behave like company unions. Instead of mass picketing that defies all court injunctions, the union bureaucracies set up purely informational picket lines which allow scabs to enter the plants and offices; similarly, the union bureaucracies obey court injunctions and substitute useless rallies, aimed at pressuring the Democrats, for militant class struggle actions.

That is not the way to victory. If we want to survive the attacks of the 1990s, we must learn from the successful methods of the 1930s. We must enhance work stoppages with tactics such as sit-down strikes; defy court injunctions with mass mobilizations; defend strikes with cruising (mobile) pickets, and, when mass support makes it possible to do so, carry on industry-wide strikes and even general strikes (they did it

successfully in the 1930s!). For example, it is clear that the recent strike at American Airlines (see pp. 18-19) could not have become a real victory without expanding to the rest of the airlines — and it would have been possible to do this, since all airline workers face similar attacks and many workers are beginning to realize that the capitulationist strategy of the union leaders leads only to defeats and the destruction of the unions.

We must overcome the cynical attitude of the union bureaucrats and the left who say that the workers are not ready for militant political action. Objectively speaking, unless the workers take up the class struggle methods of the 1930s and go beyond them, they will face the destruction of what is left of the unions. Unless they fight back, the workers will face increasingly sweatshop-like working conditions combined with terrible reductions in their standard of living. The sad fact is that the capitalists are already halfway to accomplishing this. And finally and most importantly, we must learn from the grave political errors of the 1930s, and begin *today* to build a real mass fighting labor party with an anti-capitalist program of action.

**For mass meetings to elect strike committees that will not rely on the union bureaucrats and can win strikes!**

**For mass picketing to keep all scabs out!**

**Occupy all factories that threaten bankruptcy!**

**Nationalize all bankrupt factories under workers' control!**

The labor party of the 1990s, like the LNPL in the 1930s, will not lead to any real gains unless it is based on the militant rank and file of the unions and is independent of the twin parties of capital. Thus, the struggle to build a fighting labor party can only succeed if it is linked to the struggle against capitalism. In response to union bureaucrats like Tony Mazzocchi who only talk about building a labor party but take no concrete action (see "How To Build a Labor Party: Our Approach to Labor Party Advocates," *International Trotskyist* #4), we demand:

**Break with the Democrats and Republicans! Build a fighting labor party now!**

**No reliance on the labor bureaucrats who try to put pressure on the Democrats!**

**For mass meetings, organized at the workplaces, to discuss the program of the labor party and how to back up the program through mass actions!**

**For independent labor candidates in the elections who support militant class actions!**

Many of the gains won by the American working class in the 1930s are under attack today, but it is not too late to fight back and win. We must look at the situation in the 1990s as another opportunity to win real gains, but we need to build the leadership and develop the program for a victory. With the accelerating decay and crisis of capitalism, it is not possible to win partial victories and maintain them for a long time. Any mass struggles that will go forward will have to be linked to the fundamental struggle to abolish capitalism once and for all.